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Abstract. Where nations depend on resources originating outside their bor-
ders, such as river water, some believe that the resulting international tensions
may lead to conict. Homer-Dixon (1999) and Toset et al. (2000) argue such
conict is most likely between riparian neighbours, with a militarily superior
downstream 'leader' nation. In a two stage stochastic game, solutions involv-
ing conict are more common absent a leader, where a pure strategy equilibria
may not exist. When upstream defensive expenditures substitute for water
using investments, a downstream leader may induced an arms race to increase
downstream water supplies. Water scarcity may not be a cause for war, but
may cause a buildup in arms that can make any conict between riparian
neighbours more serious.
1. Introduction
Water scarcity is expected to be one of the most serious resource issues of the
twenty-rst century, particularly in the developing world (Rosegrant, 1997). In the
literature on conict and cooperation in water management, two separate schools
of thought can be distinguished. One fears that as populations grow and demand
expands, disputes over water allocation may lead to violent international conict
(Serageldin, 1995), particularly where water is already scarce (Falkenmark, 1990;
Gleick, 1993; Sandler, 2000). In contrast, others argue that scarcity will promote
increased cooperation (Giordano et al., 2002; Giordano and Wolf, 2003; Wolf et al.,
2003; Dinar and Dinar, 2004), citing as support the absence of strong empirical
evidence that past wars have been fought over water. The fears that wars will be
fought over water seems to be borne out by the popular belief that wars are more
common in arid regions. However, to reconcile this with the lack of evidence that
water disputes have triggered wars, as an alternative we consider how disputes over
water may set the conditions for war by encouraging military spending.
A very supercial examination of the data is weakly supportive of the hypothesis
that the more sensitive an economy is to water scarcity, the greater the share
of economic output spent on the military. Figure 1 plots, for all nations with
World Resources Institute water availability data and World Bank military and
development data, military expenditure as a share of GDP against the per capita
renewable water supply, dependency - the share of the water used in a nation
that comes in from outside, and the share of the national economy represented
by agriculture. With an admittedly healthy dose of imagination, one can see that
military spending decreases with water availability, increases with dependency, and
with the importance of agriculture to the national economy. The eect appears
strongest when water availability is low. However, the fact that the relationship is
1
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at best weakly apparent in the graphs suggests that there may be other eects or
interactions not captured in this visual representation.
[Figure 1 about here.]
As there are almost certainly a range of variables that aect military expendi-
tures, it is unlikely that the relationships will stand out strongly in a graph. The
data can be explored in a bit more depth with regressions. Table 1 shows multiple
regression results for two regressions using all the data, and two for nations with less
than 10,000 m
3
of water available per year per person. Given the failure to account
for political factors beyond corruption and stability, it is not surprising that the
explanatory power of the models is very low. However, there is some weak evidence
of a link between water availability and military spending. For all the data, increas-
ing water availability correlates with a decrease in military spending, as a share of
GDP, with statistical signicance for nations where per capita water availability is
low. Although not signicant, the relationships between dependency and the share
of agriculture's value in GDP are suggestive. As the dependency increases, military
spending increases, whether we consider all the data or the more arid subset. As
the importance of agriculture increases, military expenditure increase for the total
dataset, but declines in the arid part of the dataset. To rationalize this, perhaps
some nations, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, are so arid that agriculture ceases
to be an important component of the economy. A nation's military spending is
certainly the result of a complex decision environment, so that it is not surprising
that it is dicult to nd any statistically signicant results. However, they are not
inconsistent with the idea that water scarcity and military spending are related, a
relationship which we explore with the model developed in this paper.
[Table 1 about here.]
This casual empiricism suggests that military spending may be inuenced by wa-
ter availability. However, there is considerable doubt about whether water scarcity
leads to international conict. If military conict is not a tool for securing water,
then assuming these empirical results are valid, the question is why would water
scarcity lead nations to have higher levels of military spending. Assuming that
nations behave rationally, this military spending must result in a gain to nations
involved, relative to one or both not doing so. We propose that such a mechanism
exists, principally through the crowding out eect military spending can have on
other investments that can consume more water. Thus, if a downstream nation
can induce an upstream rival to spend on its military rather than on water using
investments, it can secure more water for itself.
Although unable to explicitly identify water wars, the empirical evidence is not
unequivocal. Some empirical research suggests that violent conict between cul-
tural groups can be an eort to capture resources, particularly when the risk of
natural disasters is high (Ember and Ember, 1992). There is also evidence suggest-
ing that population pressure is related to involvement in military conicts (Tir and
Diehl, 1998). Further, modern asymmetries in military technology may increase the
attractiveness of using force on the part of the stronger adversary (Orme, 1997).
Although agreeing that resource scarcity can increase conict, Homer-Dixon (1991,
1994, 1999) argues violence is more likely to occur within, rather than between,
nations as interest groups battle for resource access. According to Homer-Dixon,
international wars over water are likely only when a downstream nation is highly
dependent on a water source that an upstream nation can substantially disrupt,
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that there is a history of antagonism between the nations, and that the down-
stream nation has substantially superior military power
1
. Based on a review of the
literature relating the environment and violent conict, Gleditsch (1998) nds that
to date, little research had eectively tested these relationships. In this paper we
show that if a military superiority can be modelled as Stackleberg leadership in
military expenditures, then the Homer-Dixon conjecture may be wrong.
Recent work has brought greater empiricism to bear on the water and conict
question. Giordano and Wolf (2003) and Wolf et al. (2003), on the basis of an
extensive data base on international river basins, interpret the lack of obvious wa-
ter wars as supporting the hypothesis that cooperation is enhanced when scarcity
increases. They nuance this by arguing that water scarcity may both be a cause
of conict and stimulus to cooperation. Likewise Dinar and Dinar (2004), argue
that although water wars have been rare, this does not mean that they will never
occur, and emphasize that governance and scarcity interact to aect the degree
of cooperation. Toset et al. (2000) and Gleditsch et al. (2004) bridge the dier-
ence between the 'water-war' and 'water-cooperation' schools. Using a database
on international conicts from 1880-1992, they nd that the probability of inter-
national conict increases in the presence of shared rivers. Further, they show
that the presence of major powers results in a higher risk of conict. However,
they argue that this is not evidence for 'water wars' but [that] shared water re-
sources can stimulate low-level interstate conict (Gleditsch et al. (2004), p. 22).
They agree with LeMarquand (1977), that upstream-downstream relationships are
conict prone and that military threat and boycots routinely become part of bar-
gaining behavior (Toset et al. (2000), p.977). However, they suggest that this may
be an incentive to cooperate. This paper contributes to this discussion by exploring
theoretically how the likelihood of upstream-downstream disputes over scarce water
resources are aected by the presence of a 'leader' nation, and conditions aecting
military escalation or cooperation.
The Nile basin is commonly cited as a case where military posturing may inu-
ence water sharing. The Nile has the characteristics described by Homer-Dixon and
Toset et al. (2000) as creating a situation particularly prone to dispute. Although
the recent Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), aimed at more cooperative management of
the Nile Basin, is cause for optimism, it is likely premature to conclude that ag-
gressive acts have been banished forever. Egypt, at the bottom of the Nile, relies
on the river for virtually all of its water needs. It also has the largest military,
largest economy, and one of the largest populations of any nation in the basin (Di-
nar and Alemu, 2000; Rached et al., 1996). Ethiopia, among the poorest nations
in the basin, is the source of over 70% of the water reaching Egypt. Following
recent droughts, Ethiopia is keenly aware of how it could benet by capturing and
using more of the water that falls within its boundaries. It has been very hesi-
tant to participate in any agreements that would commit it to a particular sharing
arrangement (Swain, 1997). However, Egypt is also aware that any increase in stor-
age capacity and water usage by Ethiopia may threaten its water security. Egypt
has indicated it will take any action necessary, including military action, to defend
its water supply, a key input into its economy (Gleick, 1993; Ndege, 1996; Wiebe,
1
We will refer to this idea as the Homer-Dixon conjecture. This terminology is, as far as we can
tell, unique to this paper.
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2001). It is within this context that the riparian nations of the Nile basin are seek-
ing arrangements to share the Nile waters (Council of Ministers of Water Aairs of
the Nile Basin States, 2001). There are a range of ways in which cooperative devel-
opment of the Nile could benet the riparian nations (Wichelns et al., 2003), but
these would involve levels of political and economic integration that will be dicult
to implement (Dinar and Wolf, 1994; Dinar and Alemu, 2000). Understanding the
strategic issues that will impact on these negotiations is particularly important at
this time, an understanding to which this paper contributes.
Our analysis builds on the resource capture games literature, which examines
when cooperation can be sustained between agents who can steal from each other,
in an environment absent a regulator. Military expenditures enter a conict func-
tion, which determines the likelihood of successful resource capture. Skaperdas
(1992) highlights the importance of the relative productivity of military investment
in determining whether an equilibrium without engagement can be supported. Hir-
shleifer (1995) develops a resource capture model to evaluate the relative stability
of 'anarchy', dened as a situation in which contenders struggle to conquer and
defend durable resources, without eective regulation by either higher authorities
or social pressures (Hirshleifer, 1995, p. 27). It is shown that changes in the
eectiveness of military power or relative strength are important factors in deter-
mining whether 'anarchy' is stable. A particularly interesting result is that when
one nation can act as a leader, it is able to gain in absolute terms, but in relative
terms the follower gains more. Cothren (2000) integrates these approaches. In his
model, the only impact of military accumulation is through the conict function.
Nash equilibria exist where both nations have sucient military capacity to deter
potential attacks by their rival, with both nations indierent between attacking and
not attacking.
Our analysis adds to the conict versus cooperation debate by explicitly examin-
ing the role of leadership. In particular, we focus on the Homer-Dixon conjecture,
whereby conict is more likely when nations are militarily asymmetric. Our ap-
proach is similar to Cothren, in its use of an anarchy environment and a tradeo
between productive and military expenditures. We extend this approach with char-
acteristics of a riparian system, and explore the dierence between a simultaneous
and sequential move game. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we
describe a two period, two nation model, where nations rst decide how to divide an
endowment between a productive activity and military expenditures, and then one
decides whether or not to attack. A numerical demonstration follows, illustrating
the impact of simultaneous versus sequential 'leadership' play. The nal section
concludes the paper with a discussion of model extensions and implications.
2. Model
We consider a model of two riparian neighbors, both dependent on a shared river,
which originates within the upstream neighbour. If w1 and w2 are the water volumes
used by the upstream and downstream nations respectively, and V is the total water,
then 0 ≤ w1 ≤ V and 0 ≤ w2 ≤ V − w1.
2
The water each nation captures for use
depends on a capital stockKi. The function gi(Ki) measures the share of the river's
2
For simplicity, the hydrological dynamics of the river are not considered. In fact, wi represents
the dierence between the water uptake and return ow into the river. The analysis of a more
complex environment is left to future work.
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ow nation i is able to capture. The capture function is assumed continuous, with
continuous derivatives to at least the second order, and satisfying ∂gi/∂Ki > 0,
∂2gi/∂K
2
i < 0, gi(0) = 0 and limKi→∞ gi(Ki) = 1. This last assumption ensures
that with nite capital stocks, the downstream nation always receives some water.
With these denitions, w1 = V g1(K1) and w2 = V [1− g1(K1)]g2(K2), which gives
us that ∂w2/∂K1 < 0.
Water is the only input constraining production, and the only factor aecting
water capture is capital. Water enters a production function fi(wi), assumed con-
tinuous to at least two derivatives, satisfying ∂fi/∂wi > 0 and ∂
2fi/∂w
2
i < 0. For
simplicity, we write F (K1) and G(K1,K2) for the upstream and downstream na-
tions' production functions. For functions with partial derivatives, subscripts will
index the argument with respect to which the derivative is taken. Using the de-
nitions of wi, it quickly follows that F1 > 0, F11 < 0, G1 < 0, G11 > 0, G2 > 0,
G22 < 0 andG12 < 0. Welfare is a function of output, which depends on capital, but
not military spending. To concentrate on the decision to start a military conict,
we focus exclusively on the relationship between capital and military investment
when a downstream riparian neighbor can choose to attack its upstream neighbor's
capital stock. For simplicity, we do not consider the case when the upstream nation
can attack the downstream nation.
Like Cothren (2000), military expenditures aect the probability of a successful
attack, using resources that could otherwise be invested in production. We too
compare Nash equilibria with and without a military attack. However, we extend
the Cothren analysis in the following ways. First, the interaction of our nations
rests on a shared resource, rather than the potential to capture the rival's output.
Second, the attack option is targeted at capital aecting resource availability, rather
than at capturing output. Thirdly, we use a more complicated production function
that captures critical features of the resource process integrating the nations of our
model. We will also consider solutions to three investment choice game structures,
a simultaneous move game, and two sequential move games.
We develop the simultaneous investment game as a baseline to compare with
the sequential investment games. The analysis proceeds in four steps. First we
characterize the equilibria for two degenerate games, one where an attack never
occurs in the second period and the second where it always occurs. We then show
how the reaction functions are aected by allowing a second stage attack choice.
The relationships demonstrated allow us to prove that a game of this form cannot
have pure strategy equilibria where the downstream nation is indierent between
attacking and not attacking. Finally, we argue that in most situations of this type,
an attack would be less likely with a downstream leader than with no leader.
If the only choice facing each nation is the investment level, then each nation
would invest its endowment, with the downstream nation enduring lower returns as
a consequence of the water captured by the upstream nation. The welfare function
for the two nations is W1 = F (K1) and W2 = G(K1,K2) if there is no attack. The
assumptions on the water capture and production functions together ensure that
W1 and W2 satisfy strict quasi-concavity over the range of available K1 and K2
values, allowing us to make the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. For the ranges 0 ≤ K1 ≤ µ1 and 0 ≤ K2 ≤ µ2, where µi is
the endowment available to nation i, and assuming each nation seeks to maximize
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its welfare, the best response functions for the two nations are K1(K2) = µ1 and
K2(K1) = µ2, absent an attack option.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. For the upstream nation W1 = F (K1). Since
F1 > 0 for all values of K1, it immediately follows that ∂W1/∂K1 > 0, so that to
maximize welfare, the upstream nation will choose K1 = µ1. Similarly, for each
value of K1 ∈ [0, µ1], we have that G2 > 0 ensuring that ∂W2/∂K2 > 0. Therefore,
downstream welfare is maximized by choosing K2 = µ2. 
The result which follows from this proposition is that the Nash, upstream leader
and downstream leader equilibria all coincide at K1 = µ1 and K2 = µ2. For
completeness then,
Corollary 2.2. For two nations engaged in a non-cooperative simultaneous move,
upstream leader, or downstream leader game, with strategies and payos as in
Proposition 2.1, all three games have the same solution, K1 = µ1 and K2 = µ2.
Proof. Since K1(K2) = µ1 and K2(K1) = µ2, where Ki(Kj) denotes the best
response of nation i to strategy Kj, the result immediately follows. 
This game is rather uninteresting, as the downstream nation cannot inuence
the decision of the upstream nation. We therefore extend the game by allowing a
second stage decision for the downstream nation, to attack the upstream nation's
capital stock.
For the extended game, we focus exclusively on the use of military expenditure
to inuence the probability of a successful attack. A successful downstream attack
reduces the upstream capital stock to K1. Conceptually, K1 is considered to be
a structure such as a dam, and an attack either reduces the dam capacity to a
specic low level or does nothing. The scale of the engagement is not explicitly
modelled. The probability of a successful attack, the conict function (Clarke,
1993) is φ(M1,M2), where Mi is the military stock held by country i. φ(M1,M2)
is assumed continuous to at least two derivatives, with ∂φ/∂M1 < 0, ∂φ/∂M2 > 0,
∂2φ/∂M21 > 0, and ∂
2φ/∂M22 < 0. The derivatives in M1 reect increasing up-
stream military expenditures increasing the probability of successful defense, while
those in M2 reect increasing downstream military expenditures increasing attack
success probability. Both types of expenditures have diminishing returns. We also
assume that φ(, 0) = 0 and φ(0, ) = 1 for all positive . With no downstream
military, very little defense is needed, while with no upstream military, attack
success is guaranteed with very little downstream military expenditure. Finally,
with endowment µi split such that Ki + Mi = µi, then the conict function is
pi(K1,K2) = φ(µ1 −K1, µ2 −K2), satisfying pi1 > 0, pi11 < 0, pi2 < 0 and pi22 > 0.
Before considering the two stage game, we describe the features of the game
when an attack always occurs. In this case the expected welfare functions are
WA1 (K1,K2) = pi(K1,K2)F (K1) + [1− pi(K1,K2)]F (K1)(1)
WA2 (K1,K2) = pi(K1,K2)G(K1,K2) + [1− pi(K1,K2)]G(K1,K2)− C2(2)
where K1 is the level to which a successful downstream attack reduces upstream
capital, and C2 is the cost of that attack to the downstream nation. This cost
measures impacts to the downstream nation that would not occur if the nation did
not choose to attack. This could be the cost of the military equipment used, the
impact of sanctions imposed by the international community, or any other cost that
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would not be experienced absent an attack. A defense cost for the upstream nation
could also be included. However, as the upstream nation is not choosing whether
or not to defend, such a cost is irrelevant to the upstream nation's choice. It is
therefore not explicitly included. With ∂WA1 /∂K1
∣
∣
K1=K1
= (1 − pi)F1 > 0 for all
K2, it follows that K1(K2) > K1. By assuming that for K1 ≤ K1, F (K1) = F (K1)
and G(K1,K2) = G(K1,K2), then if K1 < K1, an attack has no eect. No
attack will therefore occur if K1 ≤ K1. For conciseness, we dene F = F (K1),
F = F (K1), G = G(K1,K2) and G = G(K1,K2). Since the upstream nation's
output is increasing in K1, and since K1 does not crowd out consumption, the
upstream nation will therefore never choose K1 < K1. Thus, we only need to
consider values of K1 that lie between K1 and µ1. Using the assumptions outlined
above, it is relatively easy to show that (1) is strictly concave with respect to K1
and that (2) is strictly concave with respect to K2. The convexity of the welfare
functions when an attack always occurs ensures that the best response function is
single valued. The derivative conditions and boundary conditions also ensure that
it will be interior. We state this as a proposition.
Proposition 2.3. For all values of K2 ∈ [0, µ2), the best response function K1(K2)
satises 0 < K1(K2) < µ1, and for all values of K1 ∈ (K1, µ1],the best response
function K2(K1) satises 0 < K2(K1) < µ2, provided that G2 + pi2(G − G) < 0.
Also, K1(µ2) = µ1 and for K1 ∈ [0,K1], K2(K1) = µ2.
Proof. Since both welfare functions are concave, by virtue of the assumptions on
the component functions, we only need toshow that over the indicated ranges, the
welfare functions are increasing on the lower boundary and decreasing on the upper
boundary. For the upstream nation, ∂WA1 /∂K1
∣
∣
K1=K1
= (1 − pi)F1 > 0 and, as
pi(µ1,K2) = 1 for allK2 < µ2, ∂W
A
1 /∂K1
∣
∣
K1=µ1
= pi1(F−F ) < 0. This establishes
the rst result. For the downstream nation, ∂WA2 /∂K2
∣
∣
K2=0
= piG2+(1−pi)G2 > 0
and ∂WA2 /∂K2
∣
∣
K2=µ2
= pi2(G − G) + G2 when K1 ∈ (K1, µ1]. Thus, if pi2(G −
G) +G2 < 0, an interior maximum exists. When K2 = µ2, pi(K1, µ2) = 0, so that
K1(µ2) = µ1. Finally, when K1 ∈ [0,K1], ∂W
A
2 /∂K2 = G2 > 0 for all K1, so that
K2(K1) = µ2. 
The additional condition G2+pi2(G−G) < 0 means that the change in expected
gain resulting from a reduction in K2 (increase in military expenditure), pi2(G−G),
must be greater than the loss in output, G2, when K2 = µ2. If this were not the
case, then it would never be worthwhile investing in the military, reducing the
exercise to the solution for proposition 2.1.
Corollary 2.4. A game with payo functions as in equations 1 and 2, with pi2(G−
G) +G2 < 0, must have an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition 2.3 establishes that the best responses are interior, relative to
their arguments, over the range K1 ∈ (K1, µ1] and K2 ∈ [0, µ2). Continuity as-
sumptions on the components of the welfare functions result in the best response
functions being continuous in both arguments in this region. The assumption that
∂WA1 /∂K1
∣
∣
K1=K1
> 0, which implies that K1(K2) > K1 everywhere, ensures
that the upstream best response does not pass through the discontinuity in the
downstream best response at K1. All the requirements of Kakutani's xed point
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theorem are therefore strictly satised on the restricted range (K1, µ1] × [0, µ2],
which conrms the result. 
When the second stage attack decision is part of the game, and the downstream
nation is assumed to attack whenever this is expected return maximizing, then the
investment choice space can be partitioned into those investment pairs that will
result in an attack and those that will not. Let the attack set be called QA, which
is dened as
QA = {(K1,K2) ∈ [0, µ1]× [0, µ2]|piG+ (1 − pi)G− C2 > G}
Also let QA(K1) be the subset of Q
A
where the value of K1 is xed. Further let Q
A
be the complement of QA, the set of strategy combinations where an attack will
not occur. The fact that QA is open on the interior of the strategy space means
that Q
A
is closed on the interior. Both sets are closed along the boundary of the
strategy space. See gure 2 for a graphical presentation of these set denitions.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Notice that so long as C2 > 0, it follows immediately that Q
A
will not contain
the boundaries K1 = 0, K2 = 0 and K2 = µ2. To see this, consider each case in
turn. First, when K1 = 0, piG + (1 − pi)G − C2 = G − C2, because G = G when
K1 = 0. Since G − C < G for all C > 0, we have the rst result. When K2 = 0,
G = G = 0, so that piG + (1− pi)G − C = −C < 0, establishing the second result.
Finally, when K2 = µ2, then pi = 0, which leads to piG+(1−pi)G−C = G−C < G
for all C > 0, completing the set. Using these facts, we can conclude that the
downstream best response curve must have a discontinuity in the two stage game,
and that the upstream best response cannot include points in the interior of Q
A
.
We state these results as two propositions.
Proposition 2.5. For the two stage game, the downstream best response function
in the rst stage, applying sub-game perfection to the second stage, has at least one
discontinuous break.
Proof. Let KA2 (K1) be the best response conditional on an attack always occur-
ring. Proposition 2.1 establishes that the best response functions when there
is no attack are K1 = µ1 and K2 = µ2. Thus, when the sub-game does not
result in an attack, which occurs for all K1 where Q
A(K1) is empty or where
WA2 (K1,K
A
2 (K1)) ≤ W2(K1, µ2), then the best response is K2 = µ2. When
WA2 (K1,K
A
2 (K1)) > W2(K1, µ2) , proposition 2.3 shows thatK2(K1) is interior. At
values of K1 when W
A
2 (K1,K
A
2 (K1)) = W2(K1, µ2), the best response consists of
twoK2 values, K2 = µ2 and a K2 value in the interior of Q
A(K1). This latter point
must be true because with G2 > 0, which leads to ∂W2/∂K2 > 0, there must be
a region between KA2 (K1) and µ2 where ∂W
A
2 /∂K2 < 0 or we could not have that
WA2 (K1,K
A
2 (K1)) ≥ W2(K1, µ2). Since one best response is interior to Q
A(K1)
and the boundary is not in QA(K1), there must be a discontinuous break. 
This proposition establishes that there must be a gap between points b and c
in gure 2. Beginning at point b, the return to the downstream nation falls as K2
is reduced. Likewise, beginning from c, the return falls as K2 is increased. The
return is lowest at the boundary between QA and Q
A
. Since K1 is equal at points
b and c, and the return to the downstream nation is greatest for this level of K1 at
points b and c, only points b and c can be in the best response K2(K1).
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Proposition 2.6. For the two stage game, the upstream best response function in
the rst stage, applying sub-game perfection to the second stage, is either on the
boundary of Q
A
or contains strategy combinations in the interior of QA.
Proof. Assume that C > 0, so that Q
A
has an interior. For all strategy combina-
tions in Q
A
,W1 = F (K1). Since F1 > 0 for allK2, for any points not on the bound-
ary of Q
A
,W1 can be increased by increasingK1. Notice that theK1 = 0 cannot be
in a best response. The best response will be {K1 ∈ Q
A
(K2)|K1 = max[Q
A
(K2)]},
the boundary of Q
A
, except where F (max[Q
A
(K2)]) <
maxK1∈QA(K2)W
A
1 (K1,K2). In this latter case, the best response is interior to
QA. 
Propositions 2.5 and 2.6 establish the conditions sucient to show that there
cannot be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for games of this form where, at the
equilibrium, the downstream nation is indierent between attacking and not at-
tacking. If attacking is ever a best response, any pure strategy Nash equilibrium
without an attack must be on this boundary. Thus, with the asymmetry introduced
by the riparian environment, the armed stando equilibrium common in resource
capture games does not occur. By establishing that such equilibria do not exist, we
can then conclude that if there is a Nash equilibrium, it must be a mixed strategy
equilibrium, and our function denitions ensure that these mixed strategy equilib-
ria cannot put zero weight on realizations not in QA. Using this result we can then
argue that in many such situations, leadership will not lead to attack while not
having a leader has a nonzero attack probability. This contradicts Homer-Dixon's
conjecture.
Let Γ be a two stage game where payos are either F (K1) and G(K1,K2) or as
in equations 1 and 2, with properties as outlined earlier. Player two chooses which
payo functions will apply in the second stage of the game, after both players have
chosen values for K1 and K2. We state the non-existence result as a theorem.
Theorem 2.7. For any two stage, two player game with the form of Γ, a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium where the payo choosing player is indierent between
second stage choices does not exist.
Proof. Proposition 2.6 establishes that the upstream best response is either on the
boundary outside QA, inside QA, or equal to µ1. Along the boundary of Q
A
,
adjacent to QA, W2(K1,K2) = W
A
2 (K1,K2). Proposition 2.1 shows that when
(K1,K2(K1)) ∈ Q
A
, K2(K1) = µ2. When C > 0, so that Q
A
has an interior,
µ2 cannot be in the set of points that dene the boundary of Q
A
adjacent to
QA. Therefore, since the gap(s) in the downstream best response occur where
G(K1,K2(K1)) = G(K1, µ2) (proposition 2.5), these gaps must span the boundary.
Since pure strategy Nash equilibria with the downstream nation indierent about
attacking must lie on the boundary, no such Nash equilibria can exist. 
Graphically, the gap between points b and c in gure 2 cannot contact the
boundary between Q
A
and QA. As a result, an equilbria cannot exist where the
downstream nation is just indierent between attacking and not attacking. The
only Nash equilibria possible for this game are therefore mixed strategy equilibria.
Further, since the structure introduces a non-concavity into the payo functions
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of the overall game, there is no guarantee that there will be a mixed strategy
equilibria either (see Osborne and Rubenstein 1994 for existence conditions for
Nash equilibria). It can be shown that the upstream nation's payo functions both
with and without an attack are strictly quasi-concave for the arguments K1 and
K2. Strict quasi-concavity means that for any set of K2 values and probability
distribution over those values, there will be a single K1 value that maximizes the
expected payo. Therefore, the upstream nation will only have a pure strategy best
response to any mixed strategy played by the downstream nation if the realizations
are either all in QA or all in Q
A
. Since K2(K1) is also single valued in these
regions, no mixed strategy equilibria can exists which does not generate realizations
in both QA and Q
A
. This means that if we observed a large number of independent
replications of this game, when a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, we would
expect to see the attack option being exercised in some realizations.
With reference to the proposal that water wars are more likely when there is a
downstream leader, to support it we must show that a downstream leader would
play a strategy that is more likely to lead to an attack. A downstream leader
chooses K2, incorporating the upstream best response K1(K2). There are three
cases to consider, when the upstream best response lies entirely outside the attack
region, when there is a Nash equilibrium inside the attack region, and when there
is no Nash equilibrium, but a portion of the upstream best response function lies
in the attack region. In the rst case, clearly, when K1(K2) is entirely in Q
A
, all
downstream leader outcomes will involve (K1,K2) ∈ Q
A
, which will never result
in an attack. Thus, in these cases the likelihood of a downstream leader attacking
cannot exceed that for the simultaneous move game. For the second case, note that
when a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists for the simultaneous move game, it
will always involve an attack in the second stage. As such, in this situation, a
downstream leader cannot increase the likelihood of an attack.
The only cases where downstream leadership may increase the risk of violence
is when the upstream best response includes a segment inside QA not intersecting
K2(K1) inside Q
A
. The downstream leader may now prefer a point on K1(K2)
where attacking is rational, while without a leader it need not always involve an
attack. Unfortunately for our analysis, within this region, whether or not it is
rational for the downstream nation to attack depends on the forms for the produc-
tion and attack success functions. To explore this, consider a case where a down-
stream leader is indierent between attacking and not attacking. Let K1 = K1(K2)
when K2 maximizes G(K1,K2) for K2 in Q
A
, and let KA1 = K1(K
A
2 ) when K
A
2
maximizes W2(K
A
1 ,K
A
2 ) in Q
A
. To simplify the exposition, let pi = pi(K1,K2),
piA = piA(KA1 ,K
A
2 ), G = G(K1,K2), G = G(K1,K2), G
A = G(KA1 ,K
A
2 ) and
GA = G(K1,K
A
2 ).
When the downstream leader is indierent between choosingK1 andK
A
1 , it must
be true that G = piAGA + (1 − piA)GA − C2. Since (K1,K2) is on the boundary
of Q
A
, it must also be true that G = piG + (1 − pi)G − C2. This second relation
requires that at the boundary, G = G−C2/pi. Taking this result together with the
indierence conditions, it follows that piAGA + (1− piA)GA = G− C2(1/pi − 1), or
that piA(GA−GA)+ (G−GA) = C2(1/pi−1). Whether or not this can be satised
depends on the forms of pi and G.
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The critical question is whether this condition can be satised while a Nash
equilibrium does not exist. To do this, we consider a limiting case, that where
there is only one interior point in K1(K2). In gure 2 in this case, points d and
f and points e and g coincide. When this is true, GA = G, so that indierence
for the downstream leader requires that (1 − piA)(G − GA) = C2(1/pi − 1). Since
G > GA (K2is xed) and pi
A < 1, there is no contradition. All that is required
is the right functional forms. If this point is to be a Nash equilibrium, it must
also satisfy K2 = K2(K
A
1 ). Since there is nothing about the indierence along
K2 that requires K2 to also maximize W2 at K
A
1 , in particular for K2 in Q
A(KA1 )
, it is entirely possible that it may be rational for a leader to choose to attack
while no Nash equilibrium exists. Whether or not this is the case then depends
on the functional forms involved. For the numerical example shown below, no
such cases were found. Consequently, if downstream leadership is to increase the
likelihood of interstate military conict, relative to the case with no leader, a rather
specic set of relationships must be in place. Thus, although we are unable to rule
out downstream leadership on a river increasing the likelihood of war in some
circumstances, we can rule out the conclusion that the presence of a militarily
superior downstream riparian in itself increases the likelihood of military conict
over water.
3. Numerical Example
To illustrate the analytical results, we use a numerical example. The assumptions
on the water capture functions are satised by implementing them as
w1 = P (1− e
−g1K1)
w2 = (P − w1)(1− e
−g2K2)
where P is the precipitation in the upstream nation and gi is the eectiveness of
investment at water capture. This water enters a production function
F1(K1) = [w1(K1)]
α1
F2(K1,K2) = [w2(K1,K2)]
α2
where 0 < αi < 1 ensures diminishing marginal productivity. The conict function,
identical to that used by Cothren (2000), is
piK(K1,K2) =
µ2 −K2
(µ1 −K1) + (µ2 −K2)
with pi(µ1, µ2) = 0. Figure 3 shows the production and conict functions, both
dened in terms investment levels K1 and K2, with parameters µ1 = µ2 = 10,
P = 10, g1 = g2 = 0.5, and α1 = α2 = 0.75. Notice that with symmetric parameter
values, F1(K1) = F2(0,K1), so that the upstream production function can also be
seen in gure 3, where K1 = 0. All results and graphics were generated using R
(Ihaka and Gentleman, 1996).
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4 shows the best response functions for the two nations, for four dierent
attack costs. In all cases, a portion of the upstream nation's best response curve
follows the boundary between the regions where a second stage attack is rational and
where it is not. With low attack cost (C2 = 0.5), a large segment of the upstream
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best response lies inside the attack region. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists,
and is located inside the attack region, at the intersection of the best response
curves. The sequential game equilibria, both with pure strategies, lie close to the
Nash equilibria. The investment levels and expected payos are given in table 2.
[Figure 4 about here.]
With costs at C2 = 1.0, the share of the upstream best response located along the
boundary of the attack region increases. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
attack region no longer exists. Although not a Nash equilibria in a one shot game,
the average of a best response cycle is indicated in the gure. A best response cycle
is a sequence of strategy proles, where each strategy prole is the best response for
each player to the rival's strategy in the previous point in the cycle. For this cycle,
an attack is rational for approximately 63% of cycle strategy combinations. For
both sequential games, attacking is not rational. When the upstream nation leads,
it selects the largest K1 such that the downstream nation chooses K2 = µ2, where
an attack is not rational. With a downstream leader, K2 is chosen along K1(K2)
to maximize downstream welfare. This occurs for a point on the attack region
boundary, again where an attack is not rational. Notice that relative to the cycle
average, the downstream leader has reduced investment (increased its military)
which induces lower upstream investment (larger upstream military), resulting in
greater downstream welfare. Thus, this downstream lead 'arms race' has increased
downstream welfare and reduced upstream welfare.
[Table 2 about here.]
Further increasing the attack cost to C2 = 2.0 closes the discontinuity in the up-
stream best response. The upstream best response now coincides with the boundary
of the attack region. The upstream nation now only responds with investment levels
that make it irrational for an attack in the second stage. However, the disconti-
nuity in the downstream best response curve is such that no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists. If the upstream nation leads, it chooses the largest K1 such
that the downstream response is K2 = µ2 and no attack. If the downstream nation
leads, it chooses the point along the boundary of the attack region where its welfare
is maximized. Even without an attack, military spending again exceeds the cycle
average, while increasing downstream welfare.
Finally, panel (d), plots the C2 = 6.0 case. Now there is only a small set of
strategy pairs where an attack is optimal. The cycle average continues to have a
relatively high attack rate at 60%. If the upstream nation chooses its investment
rst, it is able to increase its return by keeping K2 = 10. However, when the
downstream nation leads, it is unable to increase its welfare relative to the cycle
average. Downstream leadership now has no advantage.
Since leadership by either nation is questionable when both nations are identical,
we also consider three cases where downstream leadership is more credible. These
are shown in gure 5, with numerical values in table 3. Panel (a) reproduces the
results of panel (b) in gure 4. In panel (b), the downstream endowment has been
increased to µ2 = 30. As a share of endowment, the upstream best response has
shifted down; with a larger endowment, a larger share is devoted to the military.
Conceptually, the larger endowment increases the relative marginal productivity of
military spending, used to 'liberate' upstream water. With the downstream leader,
the solution does not involve an attack. Further, relative to the cycle average, a 56%
reduction in productive investment, from 22.7 units down to 9.99 units, results in a
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43% increase in welfare, from 5.29 to 7.59 units. This compares to a 43% reduction
in investment generating a 26% increase in return for the µ2 = 10 case. With a
larger endowment, a downstream leader is again better o not attacking, and gains
more in relative terms than when endowments are equal.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
Panel (c) increases the eectiveness of the downstream water capture investment.
As for the endowment increase, the downstream best response shifts down. This
results in a greater share of water released by an attack being captured. There
is again no interior Nash equilibrium for the simultaneous move game. However,
the downstream leader is still better o choosing a strategy that does not lead to
an attack. In this case, a 1.3% reduction in capital investment, from 2.98 to 2.94,
increases downstream return by 37%.
Panel (d) puts the upstream nation at a technological disadvantage, in terms of
water capture eectiveness, by setting α1 = 0.5. The eect appears in table 3 as an
increase in K1 and a reduction in W1, relative to the panel (a) results. No portion
of the upstream best response curve is now in the interior of the attack region, so
that the downstream leader can only choose points that will not result in an attack.
In this case, a 43% reduction in investment relative to the cycle average results in a
28% increase in return. This is the smallest increase in return, but still larger than
the 26%, from 4.24 to 5.78, increase in return when both technology parameters
are equal. In all four panels, if the upstream nation is the leader, it will choose a
strategy that results in K2 = µ2 and no attack.
In both gure 4 and gure 5, strategy combinations that generate greater ex-
pected welfare for both nations than the Nash equilibrium or cycle average are
identied. The existence of these strategy combinations in all four panels shows
that this game has aspects of a prisoner's dilemma. This highlights that there
is scope for Folk theorem results, where repetition permits cooperation, allowing
Pareto improvements to be realized. From the point where the upstream best
response function becomes continuous, the range of strategy combinations which
support such cooperation increases as costs increase, with none involving an at-
tack. When the upstream best response is not continuous, the set of mutually
advantageous strategies increases as costs fall. However, some lie in the attack
region. With cheap attack costs, strategies can be coordinated to increase mutual
gain while, somewhat perversely, the downstream nation continues to attack the
upstream nation's infrastructure.
Beyond pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria, there are other solution con-
cepts. Best response cycles with various belief structures may generate equilibria.
Naive expectations, adaptive expectations and moving average expectations were
tried in this numerical example, always resulting in periodic attacks. A version
of this model, focusing only on the simultaneous move form, was implemented as
an experiment (Janmaat, 2004). Subjects playing repeated rounds were unable to
coordinate on no attack solutions, although average behavior tended to lie between
the attack always Nash equilibrium and a no attack point consistent with the Folk
Theorem. Further experiments will explore the impact of leadership, and seek to
identify relevant solution concepts.
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4. Discussion
In this paper we constructed a model in which two countries are connected by a
natural resource, water, and able to invest in military hardware. Downstream mil-
itary investment creates a threat to the upstream nation, while upstream military
investment provides protection against that threat. In both cases, military invest-
ment provides no direct utility or productivity impact. Thus military expenditure
is costly in terms of foregone production, and provides no benet beyond its impact
on attack success probabilities.
One general result is that for a one shot two stage game where a downstream
'leader' nation's threat can persuade an upstream neighbour to consume less wa-
ter, the likelihood of an attack occurring is likely less than absent a leader. This
contrasts with Homer-Dixon (1999) and Gleditsch et al. (2004), who argue that
militarily and economically superior nations, such as Egypt with respect to its up-
stream neighbors, are more likely to resort to force than when there is no such
dominance. Historically, Egypt was well known for threatening to use force to pro-
tect its water security. However, perhaps it is the credibility of this threat that
provides Egypt with water security, relative to a situation where its superiority is
not so apparent.
Although motivated by the Nile basin example, our results may be relevant in
other cases where resources are sequentially shared between nations. An example
without clear leadership is the dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kash-
mir region. Even though this region is an important headwater for the Indus, the
existence of a water sharing treaty suggests water is not an immediate cause of the
wars these nations have fought. However, the results of this paper suggest that the
military buildup may be in part caused by concerns over water security. Several
other river systems, such as the Jordan, the Tigris and Euphrates, the Ganges and
Brahmaputra, the Danube and the Rhine, also ow from one country to another.
The Ganges and Brahmaputra have been identied as potentially vulnerable for
conict, negotiations have recently been taking place around the Jordan and the
Tigris and Euphrates (Wolf et al., 2003). In contrast to arid region rivers, nations
along the Rhine and Danube have a long history of cooperation. Other sequential
resource movements, such as animal migration or dispersion patterns, may also t
this framework. The recent 'Turbot War' between Canada and Spain, surround-
ing shing immediately outside Canada's territorial water, is a possible example
(Missios and Plourde, 1996). Likewise, for trans-boundary aquifers or oil reserves,
military buildup may enable the nation more vulnerable to rapid drawdown of the
reservoir to induce a slower extraction rate by its neighbour.
Military investment decisions are made in a far more complex environment than
that captured in a one shot game. Generally, the interaction is repeated. Following
the Folk theorem, if this game was repeated, we expect nations to be able to
coordinate on a strategy where both are better o. As attacks destroy capital,
the repeated game equilibrium is less likely to include an attack. Further, with
the accumulation of military capital, an upstream leader may attack a downstream
rival so as to reduce its military stock, or reduce the economic output needed
to produce this military stock. For the numerical example, the sequential move
game almost never involves an attack, regardless of who leads. With repetition, an
attack is probably less likely yet. In line with the dynamics of repetition, capital
and military assets are normally accumulated over time. The opportunity cost of
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capital destruction is greater, in terms of time to rebuild. This likely increases the
incentive for the upstream nation to invest in defense, and the eectiveness of the
downstream threat. It is expected that the interaction of these eects will further
reduce the likelihood of war. We leave the details of these dynamic analyses for
future work.
While long run expected river discharge can be considered constant, for other
resources this is not true. For example, an oil eld is analogous to an aquifer, with
no natural recharge. A key variable for analyzing these situations is the size of the
resource pool, which declines over time with extraction. Although not presented,
increasing the resource supply to divide increases the likelihood of war in the nu-
merical example. With greater resource abundance, provided abundance does not
generate costs (see Janmaat and Ruijs, 2004 for impact of ooding risk on cooper-
ation), capture investment has a larger expected return, as the gain to a successful
attack is greater. The key role of the value that can be captured implies that re-
source wars are most likely to occur when scarcity has suciently increased the
value of disputed resource reserves, with enough left to make it worth ghting over.
Therefore, rather than mayhem and anarchy when oil supplies approach exhaus-
tion, as some pundits suggest, it may occur sooner, when supplies are relatively
abundant but of high value.
Our results indicate that water scarcity need not cause international violent
conict, and that when one riparian is dominant, violence is unlikely. However, in
most equilibria the downstream nation is indierent between war and peace. In the
symmetric model of Cothren (2000), nations are also indierent between attacking
and not attacking at the Nash equilibrium. Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) and Toset
et al. (2000) found a positive relationship between domestic conict and environ-
mental scarcity. However, they also found that military expenditure was the best
predictor of the severity of conict. The sources of civil conict are not necessarily
closely related to the severity of the conict. Although environmental scarcity is a
cause of conict, it is not necessarily also a catalyst (Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998,
p. 314). In the current model, water scarcity stimulates arms accumulation, but
not necessarily violent conict. Stochastic eects that change the economic or mil-
itary positions may upset this delicate balance and trigger violence. Consequently,
international military conicts may be more common where states are resource de-
pendent, even though not directly triggered by resource scarcity. In this vein, Tir
and Diehl (1998) nd a strong interaction between military capacity and population
growth as predictors of involvement in military conict, while Toset et al. (2000)
and Gleditsch et al. (2004), examining the relation between factors such as water
scarcity, leadership, regime type and conict, nd results consistent with ours.
The current model also highlights the critical role played by the cost of the attack
to the attacking nation. If the cost is low relative to the expected gain, then an
attack is rational, while if the cost is high, it is neither rational to attack nor to
invest in the military. These costs may play a key part in determining what triggers
can transform an arms race into a war. In particular, the prospect of sanctions or
other economic censure from the international community may serve to increase the
costs. This would reduce the need for the upstream nation to invest in its military,
allowing an increase productive capital investment.
Dynamically, productive capital accumulation stimulates economic growth, while
the impact of military accumulation on growth is less clear. A number of studies
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have examined the relationship between economic growth and military expendi-
tures. At a theoretical level (Zou, 1995; Blomberg, 1996; Shieh et al., 2002; Gong
and Zou, 2003), this work suggests that the eects are ambiguous. Military expen-
ditures may crowd out more productive investments - as in the model we develop
- and thereby reduce economic growth. However, this investment may also en-
hance growth by building human capital, providing social stability, etc. Empirical
analyses of this relationship - many of which preceeded the theoretical work - nd
similarly inconclusive results (LaCivita and Frederiksen, 1991; Looney, 1993; Kusi,
1994; Blomberg, 1996; Dakurah et al., 2001). Several authors conclude that this is a
consequence of the importance of context. Our results support this by highlighting
the role of one element of that context, where a nation lies in a watershed. For
an upstream nation, increasing military expenditure is likely to reduce economic
growth by crowding out productive investment. In contrast, downstream military
expenditure may, via its threat eect, lead to more water reaching the downstream
nation. Thus, whether military spending stimulates or retards economc growth
may depend on riparian position.
There are at least three empirical implications of this model that can be explored.
First, where resources are scarce and shared, the level of militarization is likely to
be high. Second, international conicts are also likely to be more frequent and
more violent where heirarchical resource dependencies exist, even though it may be
dicult to directly identify that resource scarcity is a cause. Toset et al. (2000) and
Gleditsch et al. (2004) nd support for this hypothesis. Third, as outlined above,
the correlation between economic growth and military expenditure will depend
on whether a nation provides a critical resource to a neighbour or depends on a
neighbour for a critical resource. In the former case it would be negative, while in
the latter positive. We leave detailed empirical analyses to the future.
Finally, this work points to the importance of considering the broader context
within which international conict develops. Arms accumulation may be a response
to water scarcity and dependence, while escalations may not directly ow from
the resource. The military balance may actually contribute to maintaining shar-
ing arrangements, by making defection suciently costly. Unwinding this delicate
web requires recognition of the resource underpinning. Embedding arms reduction
agreements in broader arrangements including trade and resource access is more
likely to be successful than focusing on arms alone. Further expanding to regional
arrangements may both increase the cost to downstream riparians of an attack,
while putting greater pressure on upstream riparians to respect resource sharing
arrangements. The Nile Basin Initiative may represent a move in this direction,
and we hope it proves successful.
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Figure 1. Military expenditures as aected by per capita water
availability, water dependency, and share of economic output rep-
resented by agriculture. Source: World Resource Institute Earth-
trends data (www.wri.org) and World Bank World Development
Indicators (www.worldbank.org).
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K2(K1) are best response functions for investment level. Q
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Figure 3. Production and conict functions, in terms of K1 and
K2. Parameters set at µ1 = µ2 = 10, P = 10, g1 = g2 = 0.5, and
α1 = α2 = 0.75.
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Figure 4. Best response functions, Nash equilibria, and equilibria
with upstream or downstream nation as leader. Lightly shaded re-
gion marks investment combinations where the downstream nation
will attack, while darkly shaded regions are investment combina-
tions that leave both nations better o than at the Nash equilib-
rium or cycle average.
0
2
4
6
8
10
a) C2 = 0.5
K
2
b) C2 = 1.0
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
c) C 2 = 2.0
K1
K
2
0 2 4 6 8 10
d) C2 = 6.0
K1
K1(K2)
K2(K1)
Cycle
1 leads
2 leads
Figures 25
Figure 5. Best response and attack regions for cases where the
downstream nation has a larger endowment, has better capture
technology, and is more productive in its use of water. Parameter
values are C2 = 1, µ1 = µ2 = 10, g1 = g2 = 0.5 and α1 = α2 = 0.75
unless otherwise indicated.
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Figures in bold are signicant at the 5% level.
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the payo for the cycle, and attack indicates what portion of the points
along the cycle result in a second stage attack. For '1 leads' and '2 leads'
results, the leading nation chooses its investment level, using the pure
strategy best response of the other nation in place of taking the other
nation's strategy as xed.
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3 Equilibrium strategies and payos when endowment, capture success and
output elasticity are varied. When a Nash equilibrium does not exist,
the average for a best response cycle passing through (µ1, µ2) is reported.
For the cycles, length is the number of moves before the same point is
returned to, st. dev is the standard deviation of the payo for the cycle,
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Table 1. Regression results, Est. reports parameter estimates,
and S.E. their standard error. Variables are per capita renewable
water, water dependency ratio, agriculture value share of GDP,
per capita GDP, the World Bank's corruption index and political
stability index. Per capita renewable water parameter has been
scaled to units of 1000 m
3
per person per year, and GDP has
been scaled to 1000 US$ per person per year. Figures in bold are
signicant at the 5% level.
All Data Per Capita Water < 10,000 m
3
Variable Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Water_PC -0.013 0.010 -0.011 0.009 -0.400 0.145 -0.365 0.151
Dependency 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.014
Ag_Value 0.013 0.019 0.010 0.025 -0.001 0.030 -0.018 0.043
GDP_PC -0.065 0.047 -0.069 0.068
Corruption 1.205 0.724 0.820 1.106
Stability -0.930 0.502 -0.582 0.748
Intercept 2.576 0.494 2.915 0.653 4.108 0.828 4.624 1.031
n 132 87 87
R2 0.053 0.085 0.103
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Table 2. Equilibrium strategies and payos for various attack
costs. When a Nash equilibrium does not exist, the average for a
best response cycle passing through (µ1, µ2) is reported. For the
cycles, length is the number of moves before the same point is
returned to, st. dev is the standard deviation of the payo for the
cycle, and attack indicates what portion of the points along the
cycle result in a second stage attack. For '1 leads' and '2 leads'
results, the leading nation chooses its investment level, using the
pure strategy best response of the other nation in place of taking
the other nation's strategy as xed.
Upstream Downstream Cycle
K1 W1 K2 W2 Length St. Dev Attack
C2 = 0.5
Nash 3.75 4.80 4.20 4.56 1 0.00, 0.00 1.00
1 leads 3.44 4.81 4.27 4.63 - - 1.00
2 leads 3.74 4.78 4.12 4.57 - - 1.00
C2 = 1.0
Cycle 6.93 5.14 8.42 4.24 8 3.90, 2.64 0.63
1 leads 1.51 5.87 10.0 5.35 - - 0.00
2 leads 1.13 5.03 4.83 5.78 - - 0.00
C2 = 2.0
Cycle 7.82 5.34 8.67 3.42 8 3.36, 2.27 0.63
1 leads 2.72 7.57 10.0 3.40 - - 0.00
2 leads 2.32 7.13 4.26 3.61 - - 0.00
C2 = 6.0
Cycle 9.39 5.04 8.40 1.16 10 0.78, 2.14 0.60
1 leads 8.22 9.34 10.0 0.43 - - 0.00
2 leads 8.21 9.34 4.90 0.41 - - 0.00
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Table 3. Equilibrium strategies and payos when endowment,
capture success and output elasticity are varied. When a Nash
equilibrium does not exist, the average for a best response cycle
passing through (µ1, µ2) is reported. For the cycles, length is the
number of moves before the same point is returned to, st. dev
is the standard deviation of the payo for the cycle, and attack
indicates what portion of the points along the cycle result in a
second stage attack. For '1 leads' and '2 leads' results, the leading
nation chooses its investment level, using the pure strategy best
response of the other nation in place of taking the other nation's
strategy as xed.
Upstream Downstream Cycle
K1 W1 K2 W2 Length St. Dev Attack
C2 = 1.0
Cycle 6.93 5.14 8.42 4.24 8 3.90, 2.64 0.63
1 leads 1.51 5.87 10.0 5.35 - - 0.00
2 leads 1.13 5.03 4.83 5.78 - - 0.00
µ2 = 30
Cycle 6.26 4.40 22.7 5.29 8 4.39, 9.60 0.49
1 leads 0.59 3.40 30.0 7.58 - - 0.00
2 leads 0.57 3.33 9.99 7.59 - - 0.00
g2 = 1.0
Nash 3.64 4.45 2.98 4.70 1 0.00, 0.00 1.00
1 leads 1.06 4.85 10.0 6.36 - - 0.00
2 leads 0.91 4.44 2.94 6.46 - - 0.00
α1 = 0.5
Cycle 7.14 2.79 8.51 4.15 8 3.90, 2.64 0.63
1 leads 1.51 3.25 10.0 5.34 - - 0.00
2 leads 1.13 2.94 4.83 5.78 - - 0.00
